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Biotechnology Patents and African Food Security:
Aligning America’s Patent Policies and
International Development Interests*
Michael R. Taylor & Jerry Cayford**
Substantial improvement in agricultural productivity is
essential for achieving sustainable food security and reducing
chronic rural poverty in many developing countries, especially
in sub-Saharan Africa. Modern biotechnology, along with other
important tools, can help solve some of the basic productivity
problems that plague the millions of small-scale and
subsistence farmers who are the backbone of African
agriculture.
However, important components of the
biotechnology tool kit—gene traits, plant transformation tools,
and genetically improved germplasm—have been patented in
the United States and elsewhere by companies that have little
economic incentive to develop and disseminate the technology
to meet the needs of these farmers. This article analyzes how
U.S. patent policy affects the development and dissemination of
biotechnology to improve agriculture and food security in
Africa, and the article makes the case for policy change.
Patent policy is but one example of U.S. policies and
government programs that affect food security and poverty
reduction in developing countries and that deserve scrutiny.
The United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals aim to
eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, and they recognize the
importance of developing country agriculture in achieving that
objective.1 The United States has embraced these goals,2 but
* This article is partly an encapsulation of some of the concepts and
arguments presented in an article published by the Harvard Journal of Law &
Technology. Michael R. Taylor & Jerry Cayford, American Patent Policy,
Biotechnology, and African Agriculture: The Case for Policy Change, 17 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 321 (2004).
** Mr. Michael R. Taylor is a Senior Fellow at Resources for the Future
(RFF). Dr. Jerry Cayford is a Washington-based philosopher, public policy
analyst, and former research associate at RFF.
1. The World Bank Group, Millennium Development Goals, at
http://www.developmentgoals.org (last updated Sept. 23, 2003).
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many policies of the United States are not fully aligned with
the goals or with the critical need to improve developing
country agriculture.3 This includes U.S. policies concerning
agricultural subsidies, trade barriers, development assistance,
and food aid.4 Nor does U.S. patent policy appear to be fully
aligned with the goal of achieving global food security.5
The U.S. government is a strong promoter of biotechnology
as a tool for improving food security,6 and the U.S. patent
system has enthusiastically embraced plant biotechnology
through the issuance of thousands of patents.7 The United
States is also a proponent of strong patent protection

2. President Bush told a World Bank audience early in his term that a
“world where some live in comfort and plenty, while half of the human race
lives on less than $2 a day is neither just, nor stable.” George W. Bush,
Remarks by President Bush to the World Bank (July 17, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/07/20010717–1.html.
Undersecretary of State for Business, Economic, and Agricultural Affairs,
Alan Larson recently declared that “[f]ood security is a serious foreign policy
concern that profoundly threatens human health, economic prosperity and
political stability.” Alan P. Larson, Undersecretary of State for Business,
Economic and Agricultural Affairs, Address to the House Comm. on Int'l
Relations (Apr. 1, 2003), available at http://www.useu.be/Categories/
Sustainable% 20Development/Apr0103LarsonFoodSecurity.html.
3. For a recent and accessible overview of how agricultural, trade, and
food aid policies of the United States and Europe adversely affect developing
country agriculture and food security, see generally BREAD FOR THE WORLD
INSTITUTE, AGRICULTURE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: HUNGER 2003 (Sandra
Bunch ed., Mar. 2003), available at http://www.bread.org/institute/
hunger_report/2003-pdf.htm.
4. See generally id.
5. See id. at 84-85 (noting that the U.S. is seen to favor biotechnology
and to represent the interests of multinational corporations).
6. At a June 2003 biotechnology conference in Washington, DC, for
example, President Bush said, “For the sake of a continent threatened by
famine [Africa], I urge the European governments to end their opposition to
biotechnology. We should encourage the spread of safe, effective biotechnology
to win the fight against global hunger.” BBC News, US in New Global GM
Push, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/3013394.stm (last updated June 23,
2004); see also Press Release, USAID, CABIO: Mobilizing Science and
Technology to Reduce Poverty and Hunger (June 23, 2003), available at
http://www.usaid.gov/press/factsheets/2003/fs030623_1.html.
7. See Gregory Graff, The Sources of Biological Technologies for
Agriculture: Public and Private Innovation and Patenting (Apr. 10, 2000)
(presented at the AAEA NC208 Conference on "R&D Policies and Impacts,"
Univ. of California-Berkeley, Mar. 30-31, 2001) (on file with the Minnesota
Journal of Law, Science & Technology); Bradford L. Barham et al., Trends in
University Ag-Biotech Patent Production, 24 REV. OF AGRIC. ECON. 294
(2002),
available
at
http://www.biotech.wisc.edu/seebiotech/pdfs/
aefinalbbkk.pdf.
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worldwide.8 It is thus important to explore how the U.S. stance
in these three connected areas—biotechnology, patent policy,
and the need for progress in developing country agriculture—
can be reconciled, and how food security and the broader
international interests of the United States can be advanced
through patent policy change.
To address these questions, we analyze the U.S. patent
system and patent policy as social constructs that are intended
to benefit society by fostering useful innovation and whose
performance is properly evaluated from the perspective of the
social outcomes they achieve. Under this approach, change in
patent policy is justified if it would improve dissemination of
the tools of agricultural biotechnology for important social
purposes, such as improving food security in Africa, without
significantly undercutting incentives for the invention of such
tools.
From this conceptual vantage point, we describe the
privatization of research to improve seeds through plant
biotechnology, domestic policies affecting access to patented
technologies, and U.S. “foreign policy” on patents, including the
U.S. stance on implementation of the World Trade
Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and other efforts to
harmonize patent policy internationally. We then analyze the
impact of U.S. patent practices and policies on developing
country access to biotechnology, present the case for change
across a spectrum of domestic and foreign patent policies, and
briefly analyze several possible policy changes.
This article aims to stimulate thinking among
policymakers and stakeholders about how U.S. patent policies
affect the broader U.S. interest in poverty reduction and food
security in Africa. It suggests how patent policies might be
changed to advance that interest. The authors are neither propatent nor anti-patent. We assume that patents have played
and will continue to play an important role in stimulating
private investment in plant biotechnology. Any change in U.S.
patent policy must take account of the patent system’s goal of
stimulating invention. We do not claim to have the final
8. PTO, A New Organization for a New Millennium: Performance and
Accountability Report, Forward to 2000 PTO PERFORMANCE &
ACCOUNTABILITY REP. 17, [hereinafter A New Organization for a New
Millennium], at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2000 (last visited
Sept. 21, 2004).
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answer on the ideal mix of policies in this complex area, but we
find the case for policy change convincing.
I. FOOD SECURITY, AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY,
AND THE PATENTING OF BIOTECHNOLOGY
A common reality in many developing and food-insecure
countries is that a large majority of the people depends on
agriculture for their livelihood, directly or indirectly. In subSaharan Africa, seventy percent of the people are rural and
largely agriculture-dependent.9 Although industrialization has
fueled growth and hunger reduction in some Asian economies,
it is generally recognized among experts that the poor countries
of sub-Saharan Africa must improve their agriculture and food
systems to achieve economic growth and food security.10
Moreover, according to the World Bank, global food production
will have to double by 2025 to meet rising demand.11
The lack of effective and fair markets for surplus food
production may be the greatest obstacle to improving
agriculture and food security in developing countries. Access to
local, national, and international markets is necessary to
provide farmers the incentive they need to risk their labor and
capital on expanded production. Effective markets require
sound political, economic, and social institutions and policies,
as well as transportation and other physical infrastructure,
which are lacking in many developing countries. Maintaining
effective markets in developing countries will also require
change in the agricultural and trade policies of the United
States and other industrialized countries that distort market
prices for staple commodities and create obstacles to developing
country exports.
Within this context, improving the productivity of farmers
9. AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP, GENDER, POVERTY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS ON AFRICAN COUNTRIES tbl. 3.1 (2002-2003), at
http://www.afdb.org/knowledge/statistics/statistics_indicators_gender/environ
ment/indicators_environment.htm.
10. Advances in agricultural science and technology will be an important
factor in improving nutritional security and stimulating economic growth. See
WORLD BANK, AN INTERNATIONAL ASSESSMENT ON THE ROLE OF
AGRICULTURAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN REDUCING HUNGER AND
IMPROVING RURAL LIVELIHOODS 4 (2002), at http://www.agassessment.org/
pdfs/roleofag.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
11. See WORLD BANK, ENVIRONMENTALLY AND SOCIALLY SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES AND MONOGRAPH SERIES 12, RURAL DEVELOPMENT:
FROM VISION TO ACTION 23 (1997).
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is not by itself the solution to food security. It is, however, an
important part of the picture, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.
African farmers often face difficult growing conditions, and
better access to the basic Green Revolution tools can play an
important role in improving their productivity. The Green
Revolution promoted the use of irrigation, fertilizers, pesticides,
high-yield varieties, and the greater efficiencies of monoculture
and large farm size. While the result was dramatic increases
in productivity, this was accompanied by fertilizer and
pesticide runoff into surface waters, greater soil erosion, and
other environmental costs. With the environmental lessons of
the Green Revolution in mind, many agricultural experts also
believe that the tools of modern biotechnology (including the
use of recombinant DNA technology to produce genetically
modified plants) can play a role in solving developing country
agronomic problems and increasing productivity.12 By building
into the seed itself traits for drought and disease resistance,
insect and other pest control, and improved yield under specific
local growing conditions, biotechnology may enable farmers to
increase their productivity without as much reliance on the
external inputs that characterized the Green Revolution.
Biotechnology cannot benefit African farmers, however, if
they and those who would develop the technology specifically
for developing country purposes cannot gain access. This
article focuses on the problem of access to biotechnology for
developing country purposes. The access problem arises from
the recent shift of investment in agricultural innovation from
the public sector to the private and the use of the patent system
by biotechnology companies to protect their investments.
Research breakthroughs in the use of recombinant DNA
techniques to modify plants, coupled with the 1980 U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty13
sanctioning the patenting of living organisms made by humans,
have spawned substantial investment in biotechnology by large
agricultural chemical companies and small biotech startup
12. See GORDON CONWAY, THE DOUBLY GREEN REVOLUTION: FOOD FOR
ALL IN THE 21ST CENTURY (1999); see also ISMAIL SERAGELDIN & G.J. PERSLEY,
PROMETHEAN SCIENCE: AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, THE ENVIRONMENT,
AND THE POOR (2000), at www.ifpri.org/themes/biotech/sergeldi.pdf (last

visited Nov. 16, 2004).
13. 447 U.S. 303 (1980); see also Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
443, 444-47 (1985) (expanding the scope of what the PTO considered
patentable biotechnologies from microorganisms to genetically modified
plants).
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companies, primarily in the United States and Europe.14
Increased private investment in and patenting of biotechnology
are producing significant changes in how agricultural
innovation occurs, how it is paid for, and who controls it.
For most of history, innovation in seed technology has been
a freely shared or public good.15 Farmers developed higher
yielding, better performing varieties and shared them with
neighbors. From its founding in 1862, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) has invested in research to develop
improved seed. 16 Until 1925, the USDA’s largest budget item
was a program that provided the latest seed free to farmers.17
Only in the years following World War II did a large-scale
private-sector seed industry develop in the United States and
other industrialized countries based on hybridization
technology. 18
In most developing countries, seed innovations remain
largely a public good. Farmers produce, save, and share
improved seed, and national and international agricultural
research laboratories produce innovations in seed technology
that are commonly distributed through public channels. There
are fledgling seed industries in developing countries that are
marketing privately developed hybrids and serving as
distribution channels for publicly developed seed innovation,
but in many areas, such as sub-Saharan Africa, innovation
remains largely a public enterprise and a public good.19
Internationally, the Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research (CGIAR), which is sponsored by the
World Bank and funded largely by donor countries in the
industrialized world, has played a leading role in seed
innovation, and many of its laboratories are exploring the use
of modern biotechnology to solve developing country agronomic
14. See Graff, supra note 7; Bradford Barham et al., Trends in University
Ag-Biotech Patent Production 24 REV. OF AGRIC. ECON. 294 (2002), available at
http://www.biotech.wisc.edu/seebiotech/pdfs/raefinalbbkk.pdf.
15. See Nathan A. Busch, Jack and the Beanstalk: Property Rights in
Genetically Modified Plants, 3 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 10 (2002)
(discussing the centralization of control of the germplasm base by the
government which allowed for distribution of new varieties of seeds for all
farmers).
16. Id. at 12-13.
17. Id. at 14.
18. Id. at 31.
19. Personal communication with Mark Condon, Vice President of
International Marketing, American Seed Trade Association (Jan. 24, 2002).
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problems.20
With the advent of biotechnology and the availability of
plant patents, the balance between the public and private
sectors—in terms of research and control of technology—has
shifted.21 Generally, public-sector plant breeding expenditures
for field crops have been relatively flat for decades but “appear
to have started to decline in real terms from the mid-1990s . . . .
In contrast, private-sector plant breeding investment appears
to have grown extremely rapidly” (perhaps by a factor of ten
since 1960).22 Depending on what one measures, private
expenditures appear to have passed public expenditures around
1990.23 Measured in scientist years, though, private sector
effort was more than double public effort by 1994.24
The privatization of research affects the kinds of research
done and products developed. Private companies have invested
heavily in the technology and seed companies required to bring
new products to market.25 To capture a return on this
investment, they have focused their commercial efforts,
including product development, on applications with mass
appeal to farmers who can afford the technology.26 This
economic reality creates a problem, however, because privatesector holders of biotechnology patents have little or no
20. For background on the CGIAR system, see Future Harvest, at
http://www.futureharvest.org (last visited September 21, 2004); see also
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE POOR: AN INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON BIOTECHNOLOGY (G.J. Persley & M.M. Lantin eds., 1999),
available
at
www.cgiar.org/biotech/rep0100/contents.htm;
Applied
Biotechnology Ctr. at the Int’l Maize and Wheat Improvement Ctr., Reaching
inside
the
Genome,
Reaching
Farmers
(2002),
at
www.cimmyt.org/ABC/map/about/BROCHURE97ABC/BROCHURE97ABC.ht
m (last visited Dec. 1, 2004).
21. For a discussion on how amounts of research can be calculated many
different ways, see Paul W. Heisey et al., Public Sector Plant Breeding in a
Privatizing World, AGRIC. INFO. BULL. NO. 772, Mar. 2001, available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib772/; see also Robbin Shoemaker, et
al., Economic Issues in Agricultural Biotechnology, AGRIC. INFO. BULL. NO.
762,
Mar.
2001,
at
38–39,
available
at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib762/.
22. Heisey et al., supra note 21, at 6-8.
23. Id. at 7.
24. Id. at 8; see also K.J. Frey, National Plant Breeding Study-I: Human
and Financial Resources Devoted to Plant Breeding and Development in the
United States in 1994, SPECIAL REPORT 98 IOWA AGRICULTURAL AND HOME
ECONOMICS
EXPERIMENT
STATION
(1996),
available
at
http://
www.ers.usda.gov/data/plantbreeding/Plant%20Breeding.pdf.
25. Heisey et al., supra note 21, at 1.
26. Id. at 2.
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economic incentive to use the laboratory tools or gene traits
they own to develop solutions to developing country
The market infrastructure and
agricultural problems.27
opportunity required to earn rates of return that would be
acceptable in Western financial markets simply do not exist in
most developing countries.28
Consequently, the finite capital resources of biotechnology
companies will, for the foreseeable future, continue to be
focused on meeting the needs of farmers in Western
industrialized countries and will not be deployed in substantial
measure to meet the needs of developing country farmers.
If the benefits of cutting-edge advances in seed technology,
based on modern biotechnology, are to reach the vast majority
of African farmers, it will have to occur, for the foreseeable
future, primarily through public and public-private cooperative
channels. Starting from this premise, the core policy questions
we address in this article are whether and how U.S. patent
policies could be changed to foster the development of
biotechnology for African farmers through these channels.
II. U.S. DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY ON PATENTS
It is important to distinguish conceptually between
“domestic” and “foreign” patent policies. Domestic patent
policy includes the rules governing what gets patented in the
United States and how non-patentholders might gain access to
patented technology. The Constitution of the United States
establishes the mandate for, and states the broad objective of
the U.S. patent and trademark system: “The Congress shall
have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”29 The requirements and conditions for granting
patents reflect the terms of the deal between the inventor and
society. Congress defined patentable subject matter in 35
U.S.C. § 101: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent

27. Id. at 4; see also Michael R. Taylor & Jerry Cayford, American Patent
Policy, Biotechnology, and African Agriculture: The Case for Policy Change, 17
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 334 (2004).
28. Taylor & Cayford, supra note 27, at 334.
29. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
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therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.”30 These terms ensure that the inventor’s contribution to
society has value. Hence, there is a utility requirement, so
society will receive a useful invention.31 There is a novelty
requirement, so inventors cannot offer something that society
already has.32 There is a nonobviousness requirement, so
inventors cannot offer what society would likely soon have in
any case:
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the
subject matter . . . and the prior art are such that the subject matter
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains.33

There is also a disclosure or specification requirement, so
that society actually receives the invention, in the sense that it
becomes part of the common knowledge, usable by others.34
Domestically, access to patented technology is also
governed by the operation of the patent law, which gives the
inventor a time-limited monopoly right to exploit the invention
for economic gain.35 Patent holders typically transfer patented
technology and reap economic gain through licensing or sale.
However, access to patented technology may be hampered by
the “patent thicket” problem: “an overlapping set of patent
rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new
technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees.”36
Domestic patent policy attempts to ease restrictions
through such tools as research exemptions and compulsory
license provisions.37 First, the utility patent statute does not
30. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Id. § 103(a).
34. See id. § 112 (“The specification shall contain a written description of
the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art . .
. to make and use the same . . . .).
35. See id. § 154(a)(2) (“[S]uch grant shall be for a term beginning on the
date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which
the application for the patent was filed in the United States . . . .”).
36. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent
Pools, and Standard-Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POL. AND THE ECON. 119, in
executive summary (Adam Jaffe et al. eds., 2001).
37. See JAMES LOVE AND MICHAEL PALMEDO, EXAMPLES OF COMPULSORY
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES, at ch. III
(2001) available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/us-cl.html (last visited
Sept. 21, 2004).
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explicitly allow researchers to use patented inventions freely in
their research. Courts have interpreted the law as implicitly
exempting from infringement the use of patented inventions in
non-commercial research.38 However, this exemption is narrow
in that it does not permit the use of patented technology in the
research and development of new technologies for use in
Second,
commercial research or nonresearch settings.39
compulsory licenses, like research exemptions, are tools for
adjusting the balance between the private interests of the
patent holder and a broader public interest by providing an
exception from the exclusive rights normally provided by a
patent. U.S. law provides for compulsory licenses to make a
technology available to ameliorate anticompetitive practices by
patent holders.40
While domestic patent policy involves balancing competing
interests (invention followed by dissemination and their
respective benefits versus costs) within the United States, U.S.
foreign policy on patents primarily addresses the rules and
procedures through which patents are issued, and access to
patented technologies is obtained in other countries. It is
better thought of as a species of U.S. foreign policy in the
broader sense of the term, or, more specifically, as an element
of U.S. trade and development policy. Plainly put, it involves
the one-dimensional task of pursuing the economic interest
that the United States and U.S. technology companies have in
a strong, global patent system. The countervailing interests
and costs fall largely within and upon other countries. While,
U.S. inventors gain the benefit of patent protection in other
countries, the costs of that protection, such as higher prices and
restricted access, are borne by individuals and businesses in
the other country.
The ways in which U.S. patent policy affects developing
countries are complex and multifaceted. They include domestic
policies on what gets patented under U.S. patent law, including
the direct and indirect effects of the patent thicket that has
38. Id.
39. Id. The judicially-created research exemption was narrowed even
further, perhaps to the point of eliminating it for practical purposes, by a
recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit holding, in
a case involving university researchers, that there was no protection from an
infringement claim if the research was “in keeping with the alleged infringer’s
legitimate business, regardless of commercial implications.” Madey v. Duke
Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
40. Id.
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grown up around biotechnology in the United States,41 and the
rules governing non-domestic access to U.S.-patented
technology. Developing countries are also affected by U.S.
foreign policy on patents, which is grounded in a different set of
interests and values arising outside the traditional confines of
domestic patent law and policy. It rests on the conviction that
strong intellectual property protection is important to the
economic success of U.S.-based technology companies, but it
does not involve balancing the competing interests that are
central to domestic patent policy. The effects of domestic and
international patent policies are difficult to measure, but in the
view of many well-informed stakeholders, they can be
substantial; and, in the future, developing country access to
biotechnology for food-security purposes may be affected even
more substantially by patent-related policies the U.S.
government pursues in the international arena than by its
domestic patent policies.
U.S. foreign policy on patents
manifests itself in three main contexts: implementation of the
TRIPS Agreement,42 international harmonization of patent
laws through the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO),43 and use of bilateral trade relationships to strengthen
patent protections.44 We focus here on the TRIPS and WIPO
arenas.
The TRIPS agreement is, as its name implies, a trade

41. See Shapiro, supra note 36.
42. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS – RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm (last visited Oct. 14,
2004).
43. WIPO is the international standards setting group for patent and
intellectual property matters. World Intellectual Property Organization
Website, at http://www.wipo.int (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
44. For example, in negotiating a free trade agreement with Singapore,
the U.S. won provisions that require Singapore to adopt intellectual property
protections that go beyond Singapore’s WTO and TRIPS obligations, including
giving up the explicit flexibility in Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS to choose not to
grant utility patents for plants. TRIPS, supra note 42. According to a
statement issued by the Singapore government: “The USSFTA will be a worldclass agreement. Both sides will go way above their WTO commitments. It
will be NAFTA-plus in a number of areas including the protection of
intellectual property . . . .” Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry, at
http://www.mti.gov.sg/public/FTA/frm_FTA_Default.asp?sid=36 (last visited
Nov. 16, 2004).
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agreement.45 It was negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round
of trade negotiations that concluded in 1994 and created the
WTO. Its primary objective was to reduce impediments to
trade, taking into account the need both to “promote effective
and adequate” intellectual property rights, and to ensure that
such rights do not themselves become barriers to trade.46 With
respect to patents, a core requirement of TRIPS is that
members provide for the patenting of all forms of technology in
accordance with widely accepted principles of novelty,
Further, “national
nonobviousness, and usefulness.47
treatment” shall be accorded to all members; that is, member
countries must permit nationals of other countries to obtain
patents on terms no less favorable than those accorded to their
own nationals.48
The TRIPS Agreement explicitly recognizes the need of
developing countries for “maximum flexibility” in implementing
their patent laws in ways that enable them to create “a sound
and viable technological base.”49 It contains several provisions
that give countries the flexibility to grant exceptions to patent
rights under certain circumstances, including broad authority
in Article 30 to grant exceptions when the interests of the
patent holder will not be adversely affected50 and authority in
Article 31 to provide for compulsory licenses, subject to some
conditions, when the patent holder’s interests are affected.51
45. TRIPS, supra note 42.
46. Id. pmbl.
47. See id. art. 27.1 (“patents shall be available for any inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they
are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application”).
48. Id. art. 3.1.
49. Id.
50. TRIPS, supra note 42, art. 30. “Members may provide limited
exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such
exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the
patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.” Id.
51. Article 31 provides in part:
Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter
of a patent without the authorization of the right holder . . . the
following provisions shall be respected: . . .
...
(g) authorization for such use shall be liable, subject to adequate
protection of the legitimate interests of the persons so authorized, to
be terminated if and when the circumstances which led to it cease to
exist and are unlikely to recur. . . .
(h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the
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Furthermore, Article 27.3(b) permits countries to exclude
plants and animals from patentability altogether, if an
alternative sui generis system of protection is provided.52 This
flexibility is important for countries that might judge it in their
interest to adopt a system of plant variety protection that
allows for the use of protected plants for breeding of new
varieties and for farmers to save their seed for planting the
next year. These provisions reflect the reality documented by
expert commissions and commentators that the patent and
other intellectual property needs of developing countries vary
and can be sharply different from the needs of industrialized
countries.53
Nevertheless, the United States and other Western
industrialized nations are leading a concerted effort through
WIPO54 to achieve international harmonization of patent law
beyond that provided for in TRIPS. TRIPS only established
minimum standards for adoption of patent systems by WTO
circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of
the authorization; . . .
...
(k) . . . Competent authorities shall have the authority to refuse
termination of authorization if and when the conditions which led to
such authorization are likely to recur . . . .
Id. art. 31.
52. Id. art. 27.3(b).
53. For a broad overview of this topic, see Commission on Intellectual
Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development
Policy (London, September 2002), at http://www.iprcommission.org (last
visited Sept. 8, 2004).
For an analysis specifically addressing issues
concerning TRIPS and development, see CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE USE OF COMPULSORY LICENSES: OPTIONS FOR
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (South Centre, Working Paper No. 5, 1999) at
http://www.southcentre.org/publications/complicence/toc.htm
(last
visited
Sept. 8, 2004).
54. WIPO evolved out of two 19th century international conventions on
intellectual property: the Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual
Property, Mar. 20, 1883, http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo020en.htm
[hereinafter Paris Convention], and the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/
wo/wo001en.htm. It became a United Nations agency in 1974. WIPO
administers two main treaties. One is the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT),
which seeks to harmonize standards for obtaining patents. PCT, June 19,
1970, http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/pdf/pct.pdf. The other is the Patent
Law Treaty, which aims to integrate the paperwork for obtaining patents and
promote mutual recognition of patents among the treaty parties by ensuring
that one international patent filing will have effect in all signatory countries.
Patent Law Treaty, June 1, 2000, at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/
wo038en.htm.
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members and left considerable flexibility to tailor the system to
local needs. WIPO is focusing on a more standardized “one size
fits all” approach to patents that would support the move
toward a single patent application establishing patent rights to
an invention worldwide. WIPO’s strategic goals are similar to
those of the PTO, including “maintenance and further
development of the respect of intellectual property throughout
the world” and ensuring that acquiring and enforcing patents
“should be simpler, cheaper and more secure.”55 Having many
patent offices review applications on essentially the same
invention is a duplication of effort that is costly to patent offices
and patent applicants. In November 2000, WIPO launched its
Patent Agenda, which is an effort to integrate and extend the
two aforementioned treaties in the form of a new one, to be
called the Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT).
The
objectives of the SLPT are to harmonize the basic legal
principles that govern the issuance of patents, such as the
definitions of “prior art” and utility, so that:
[A]pplicants, in all contracting parties of the SPLT, are subject to the
same substantive conditions for the grant of patents and for the
invalidation of granted patents. Such harmonization would lead to
lower costs for applicants and patent offices by contributing to a
future reduction in the duplication of search and examination work.56

If successful, WIPO’s approach to harmonization could
hinder developing countries in adopting patent regimes tailored
to their particular needs, including the need to foster
dissemination of biotechnology for food-security purposes.
Specifically, some commentators have expressed concern that
this “universal concept of patentability” would require the
patenting by developing countries of technologies that it might
not be in their interest to patent and for which patents could be
rejected under the terms of the current TRIPS agreement.57 As
one commentator observed:
[O]ne of the most significant issues on which some developing
countries expressed their position . . . was whether an invention
55. Memorandum of the WIPO Director General, Vision and Strategic
Direction of WIPO, at http://www.wipo.org/about-wipo/en/dgo/pub487.htm (last
visited Sept. 8, 2004).
56. Press Release, WIPO, Progress on Discussions to Harmonize Patent
Law, Update 164/2002 (May 14, 2002), at http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/
updates/2002/upd164.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2004).
57. See Carlos Correa, WIPO’s Patent Agenda: For Whom, S. BULL. 48,
available
at
http://www.southcentre.org/info/southbulletin/bulletin48/bulletin48-01.htm
(last visited Sept. 8, 2004).
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should show a “technical character” in order to be patentable. The
United States argued—supported by the Representatives of some of
the users group NGOs—that “requiring a technical character was
unnecessarily limiting the innovations in new fields of endeavour,
such as information technology and biotechnology, and that the term
in all fields of technology” which appeared in Article 27.1 of the
TRIPS Agreement was not mandating any requirement relating to
technical character . . . .”58

In sum, dropping the requirement of “technical character”
of inventions would substantially expand the scope of the
patent system, beyond its basic intent of promoting technical
progress.
Such a step will go well beyond the TRIPS
Agreement (which only prescribes patenting in “fields of
technology”) and the current PCT, according to which the
invention must be of “technical character.”59
III. THE CASE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR POLICY CHANGE
The United States cannot solve the world’s technological
and economic problems by itself, but the United States has a
national security interest in reducing global poverty and
hunger. It also has a duty, as the richest and most powerful
country in the world, to avoid actions and policies that have
unnecessary and avoidable adverse impacts on progress
elsewhere. This includes patent policies that adversely affect
food security in developing countries. Indeed, U.S. patents and
patent policy contribute to the difficulties researchers face in
applying biotechnology to the solution of food security problems
in developing countries. Enforcement of U.S. patents can
directly block U.S. researchers’ access to a technology either as
a legal bar to unlicensed use of a patented technology or
through the proliferation of upstream patents on research tools
described above as the “patent thicket.”60 It can also directly
impede researchers working in developing countries on
applications of biotechnology to crops intended to be exported to
58. Id.
59. Id. “The process of harmonizing “the rules and procedures of a wide
majority of countries with the practices and legislation of a small number of
countries . . . [c]ould represent, in reality, a step-backwards from the limited
aspects of flexibility stipulated in the TRIPS agreement.” The WIPO Patent
Agenda Must Promote Development, S. BULL. 48 (adapted from the statement
of the Egyptian delegation at the 37th series of Meetings of the Assemblies of
Member
States
of
WIPO),
at
http://www.southcentre.org/info/southbulletin/bulletin48/bulletin48-02.htm
(last visited Sept. 8, 2004).
60. See Shapiro, supra note 36.
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the U.S. If such crops are produced with unlicensed U.S.patented technology, importing these crops into the U.S. would
constitute an infringement of the patent.
Because researchers and research institutions in
developing countries frequently cannot navigate through the
patent thicket, the possibility that the crop will be exported to
the U.S. acts as a legal obstacle and disincentive for developing
country researchers to use U.S.-patented technologies. For
researchers working outside the U.S. on crops with little or no
export potential, use of a U.S.-patented tool for such an
improved plant is not directly blocked by U.S. patents which
are binding only in the U.S. Nevertheless, there are several
ways U.S. patents may have an indirect impact on the use of
patented technology by these researchers. First, the U.S.
government pushes hard for foreign countries and institutions
to protect the intellectual property rights of U.S. companies,
and systematic violation of U.S. patents may jeopardize
funding by the U.S. government and international financial
institutions. Further, developing country research institutions
using unlicensed patented technology may find that the
Western biotechnology companies unwilling to provide much
needed cooperation. These Western biotechnology companies
jealously guard their patents and are less likely to cooperate
with institutions that do not respect their patents.61 Finally, if
foreign researchers desire to form partnerships with patentholders to gain access to enabling technologies and necessary
know-how, they generally must enter material transfer
agreements (MTAs) that place strict restrictions on the use of
the technology.62 The leverage to impose strict MTA conditions
can operate as a de facto extension of the patent to the country
where the researcher works: to the extent the researcher was
legally free to use the invention outside the U.S., that freedom
is usually lost in the material transfer agreement.
If the United States believes biotechnology can help
improve agriculture and food security in developing countries,
61. See John Komen, International Collaboration in Agricultural
Biotechnology, in MANAGING AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: ADDRESSING
RESEARCH NEEDS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 110, 117-19, (Joel I. Cohen ed.,
1999), available at ftp://ftp.cgiar.org/isnar/ibs/III_10.pdf.
62. See Steven C. Price, Public and Private Plant Breeding, 17 NATURE
BIOTECH.
938
(1999),
available
at
http://www.biotech-info.net/
public_private.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2004); Charles Benbrook, Who
Controls and Who Will Benefit from Plant Genomics?, Feb. 19, 2000, at
http://www.biotech-info.net/AAASgen.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2004).
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and if U.S. patent policy can impede such improvement, policy
change should be considered. The case for policy change is well
grounded in the fundamental social purpose of the patent
system, which grants patents to serve society’s interests in both
the invention and dissemination of innovative technology. The
theoretical underpinnings of the U.S. patent system codified in
35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103, and 112 have been discussed above in
The patent system is an
the beginning of Part II.63
instrumental social construct intended to benefit society by
fostering useful innovation. This understanding of the system
requires us to evaluate its performance from a social outcome
perspective. From this perspective, the success of the patent
system and possible changes in patent policy are fairly judged
on the basis of whether and to what extent the societal benefits
of the system, in terms of useful innovation, exceed the societal
costs of the patent monopoly, in terms of higher prices to
consumers or constraints on access to new inventions by those
not holding patents.64 If the patent system is not achieving this
objective or could achieve it better, it is fair and appropriate to
consider policy change. Patent policies should be changed if the
changes will improve dissemination for food security or other
important social purposes without significantly undercutting
incentives for invention.
While some may argue that it is unfair to maintain that
an international concern—food security in developing
countries—is a societal interest against which U.S patent
policy is fairly judged, the United States has chosen to bring
international concerns in general, and food security in
developing countries in particular, within the legitimate scope
of domestic patent policy making. As previously noted, U.S.
patents and patent policy have extraterritorial aspirations and
impacts, including practical impacts on access to technology in
other countries. Furthermore, it is the declared objective of the
PTO to promote adoption of U.S.-like patent systems in other
countries, including developing countries.65
63. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
64. See Lester C. Thurow, Needed: A New System of Intellectual Property
Rights, Sep.-Oct. 1997 HARV. BUS. REV. 95; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents:
Help or Hindrance to Technology Transfer, in BIOTECHNOLOGY: SCIENCE,
ENGINEERING, AND ETHICAL CHALLENGES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
161, (Frederick B. Rudolph & Larry V. McIntire eds., 1996); Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law and Economics Agenda for the Patent System,
53 VAND. L. REV. 2081 (2000).
65. See James E. Rogan, Remarks at the Hearings on Competition and
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A set of possible changes in U.S. patent policy that appear
to meet the social outcome balancing test is outlined below.
They fall into three categories: changing U.S. law and policy to
improve access to patented technologies; preserving the
flexibility developing countries have in the current TRIPS
Agreement to tailor their patent systems to their local needs;
and more fully implementing Article 66.2 of TRIPS regarding
support for technology transfer.66 Most of the changes to U.S.
law considered are designed to improve access to patented
technology specifically for developing country food security
purposes. This narrow focus limits special access to cases in
which that benefit is achieved without directly competing with
the patent holder in the market (the United States) for which
the patent was granted.
The discussion is limited to a brief summary of each
possible policy change, because its primary purpose is to make
a simple point: if one accepts as a matter of principle that it is
appropriate to consider access to biotechnology for developing
country food-security purposes when formulating U.S. patent
policy, there are a number of policy alternatives that appear to
meet the threshold test of improving access without
significantly undercutting invention incentives.

Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy, Feb.
6, 2002, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/comm06feb2002.html (last
visited Sept. 8, 2004). “[T]he United States has made it a key part of its trade
policy to create international frameworks for recognizing intellectual property
rights.” Id.; see also A New Organization for a New Millennium, supra note 8,
at 15. “Many developing countries were also provided technical assistance by
the USPTO to help them implement their obligations under the Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPs).” Id.
As the largest intellectual property office in the world, the PTO is at
the forefront of developing and strengthening intellectual property
protection, both at home and abroad. The Undersecretary and
Director is the organization’s standard-bearer of intellectual property
rights protection in the global arena, advocating more efficient and
cost-effective means of protecting the IP rights of U.S. nationals
throughout the world.
Id. at 19.
66. “Developed country Members shall provide incentives to enterprises
and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and
encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country Members in order
to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base.” TRIPS, supra
note 42, art. 66.2.
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IV. IMPROVING ACCESS TO PATENTED TECHNOLOGIES
Five domestic patent policy alternatives that are worthy of
consideration are outlined below. They involve a research
exemption, compulsory licensing, a working requirement, use of
eminent domain authority, and placement of U.S. governmentfunded technology in the public domain. All involve expanding
access to patented technologies, rather than changing what
gets patented.
A. CREATE A STRONG RESEARCH EXEMPTION
Under this policy alternative, Congress would enact a
statutory limitation on the scope of the patent monopoly such
that the use of a patented tool of biotechnology in the research
and development of new applications for developing country
food-security purposes would not constitute infringement of the
patent.
The proposal would improve access to patented
biotechnology by freeing both U.S. and foreign-based
researchers to work on applying patented technology to
developing country food-security problems without concern
about infringement claims. Such a research and development
exemption as envisioned would not be limited to noncommercial users or uses of patented technology.
The
exemption is, however, only for research. If that research
produces new products that contain the original patented
invention or that cannot be exploited without infringing the
original patent, the patent holder would retain full control of
the original invention. Accordingly, the exploitation of such
dependent products would still require permission from the
patent holder.
B. ESTABLISH A COMPULSORY LICENSE REQUIREMENT FOR
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY
This policy alternative would add to U.S. patent law a
procedure to grant nonexclusive licenses to any requesting
party for the use of any patented tool of biotechnology for
developing country food security purposes. Royalties would be
set at rates (including zero) that reflect the extent of the
reasonably foreseeable value forgone by the patent holder,
taking into account the likelihood of the patent holder’s
commercialization of the technology for the developing country
purpose. Such a compulsory license provision would improve
access by ensuring that any patented tool of biotechnology
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could be used for developing country food-security purposes
without risk of patent infringement.
But it would not
significantly undercut invention incentives because the royalty
provision would make the patent holder economically whole to
the extent it would lose economic value from its own
application of the technology for developing country foodsecurity purposes.
C. ESTABLISH A “WORKING” REQUIREMENT FOR AGRICULTURAL
BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS
A “working” requirement is a condition on the right to
exclude others from using a patented invention: it limits the
exclusion right to only those applications of the invention that
the patent holder is actually working or exploiting. This policy
alternative would add to U.S. patent law a working
requirement for patented biotechnology: if, within three years
of the patent’s issuance, the patent holder has not worked the
patent for a specific developing country purpose, or has not
made it readily available by license to those who seek to use it
for that purpose, any party could apply to a designated
authority for a nonexclusive license authorizing use for such a
purpose.
This provision is modeled on the “working” provision in the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property.
Article 5(A)(4) of the Paris Convention states:
A compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of failure
to work or insufficient working before the expiration of a period of
four years from the date of filing of the patent application or three
years from the date of the grant of the patent, whichever period
expires last; it shall be refused if the patentee justifies his inaction by
legitimate reasons. Such a compulsory license shall be non-exclusive
and shall not be transferable, even in the form of the grant of a sublicense, except with that part of the enterprise or goodwill which
exploits such license.67

The TRIPS Agreement requires compliance with the Paris
Convention, first enacted in 1883, which permits, but does not
demand, a working requirement. The United States is a
signatory of the Paris Convention, but, unlike most other
countries, it has not adopted a working requirement. A
working requirement along these lines would improve access by
ensuring that, after a certain waiting period, patented tools of
biotechnology would be available for developing country food67. Paris Convention, supra note 54, art. 5(A)(4).
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security purposes without risk of patent infringement. Again,
it would not significantly undercut invention incentives,
because it would limit access to cases in which the patent
holder chose not to apply the invention to the specific
developing country food-security need in question.
D. EXERCISE U.S. EMINENT DOMAIN AUTHORITY
Under this policy alternative, the U.S. government would
exercise its existing statutory eminent domain authority under
28 U.S.C. § 1498 to authorize the use of patented tools of
biotechnology for developing country food-security purposes.
Eminent domain authority has existed in U.S. patent law since
1910.68 Under the government’s eminent domain authority,
government authorization of the use of a patented technology
insulates a user from any patent infringement claim by the
patent holder. There are no subject matter, purpose, or other
substantive restrictions on the uses of the technology for which
eminent domain authority may be exercised, and there is no
requirement for formal action by the government to invoke it.69
The existing eminent domain authority has been used
primarily for military purposes, although its use was
considered recently in a health context to make the anthrax
drug CIPRO® available more cheaply.70 Eminent domain
authority has not been exercised with respect to patents on the
tools of agricultural biotechnology.
A designated authority within the U.S. government could
establish an administrative mechanism under which a
technology developer who wanted to use the patented
technology could make application and then be deemed to be
using the technology for the United States.
The U.S.
government, rather than the technology developer, would then
be liable for any compensation to which the patent holder could
prove entitlement in court.
E. MAKE AVAILABLE U.S. GOVERNMENT-FUNDED OR
68. See Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1948)).
69. See, e.g., Bereslavsky v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 175 F.2d 148, 150-51
(4th Cir. 1949).
70. See Consumer Project on Technology, Ciprofloxacin: the Dispute over
Compulsory Licenses (noting recent publicity in international media
concerning the use of eminent domain power over the CIPRO patent), at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/cipro (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
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GOVERNMENT-OWNED BIOTECHNOLOGY
This alternative would establish as a matter of policy that
all tools of agricultural biotechnology developed by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and other U.S. government
agencies, whether patented or not, would be made available by
the government, without the need for a license or other
permission, when used for developing country food-security
purposes. The USDA and other government agencies fund
research in their own laboratories and in academic facilities
that sometimes leads to patented tools or applications of
agricultural biotechnology. The Bayh-Dole Act71 encourages
the patenting of government-funded research as a means of
fostering its dissemination and use, and USDA’s current patent
policy is based on the goal of making government-developed
technology available for development and application.72
This is consistent with the patent law, which declares:
It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system
to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally
supported research or development . . . to ensure that the
Government obtains sufficient rights to federally supported
inventions to meet the needs of the Government and protect the
public against nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions . . . .73

This declaration of policy is backed up by restrictions on
the granting of exclusive or partially exclusive licenses on
government-owned inventions, including requiring that “the
Federal agency finds that the public will be served by the
granting of the license . . . and that the proposed scope of
exclusivity is not greater than reasonably necessary.”74 On
inventions owned by a private party but whose development
was funded by the government under a cooperative research
and development agreement (CRADA), the Bayh-Dole Act
grants the government a license in the inventions to be
exercised “[a]s necessary for meeting the obligations of the
United States under any treaty, international agreement,
arrangement of cooperation, memorandum of understanding, or
similar arrangement.”75 The Rome Declaration issued at the
71. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015-28 (1980)
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000) (commonly known as the
“Bayh-Dole Act”).
72. USDA, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN ARS, 141.2-ARS (Sept. 11, 2000),
at http://www.afm.ars.usda.gov/ppweb/141-2.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
73. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000).
74. 35 U.S.C. § 209(a)(2) (2000).
75. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) (2000).
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World Food Summit of 1996 and signed by the United States,
says, “We pledge our actions and support to implement the
World Food Summit Plan of Action.”76 To date, the United
States has not exercised its retained licenses on CRADAfunded technology to advance the food security purposes of the
World Food Summit.
IV. PRESERVING FLEXIBILITY FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
The key issue in U.S. foreign policy on patents is the
degree to which the United States will support the preservation
and use of the flexibility now built into the TRIPS Agreement
for developing countries to fashion patent regimes that serve
their local technology and development needs. The United
States has been ambivalent at best on this question, supporting
TRIPS in general and touting its flexibility in dealing with
access to drugs for HIV/AIDS, while pursuing through WIPO
and bilateral and regional trade negotiations a more stringent
approach to harmonization.
To help ensure access to
biotechnology for developing country food-security purposes
without undercutting invention incentives, the United States
could support preservation and use of developing country
flexibility in several ways.
A. SUPPORT INCORPORATING TRIPS FLEXIBILITY PROVISIONS IN
ANY NEW WIPO AGREEMENT AND IN ANY BILATERAL OR
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
The TRIPS Agreement provides significant flexibility for
developing countries to devise patent regimes that serve their
local technology and development needs. The United States
could support the inclusion of these same general flexibility
provisions in the draft WIPO Substantive Patent Law Treaty
and oppose any efforts through the WIPO process to reduce the
patent policy flexibility granted developing countries in the
TRIPS Agreement. Similarly, it could accept the inclusion of
these flexibility provisions in any trade agreements it
negotiates with developing countries, reversing the trend
against flexibility set in its recent agreements with Singapore
and Chile.77 Perhaps more simply, the United States could
76. Rome Declaration on World Food Security, Nov. 13-17, 1996, at
www.fao.org/docrep/003/w3613e/w3613e00.htm.
77. See
Singapore
Ministry
of
Trade
and
Industry,
at
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refrain from incorporating any intellectual-property provisions
at all in new trade agreements with developing countries
already bound by TRIPS.
B. SUPPORT PRESERVING THE TRIPS FLEXIBILITY PROVISIONS
The TRIPS Council is reviewing the TRIPS Agreement in
the context of the Doha Round of WTO trade negotiations.78
The United States could make clear in this review that it
supports maintaining the current flexibility provisions in the
TRIPS Agreement. There are many such provisions, including:
the broad authority in Article 30 to grant benign exceptions to
patents; the Article 27.3(b) explicit right to exclude plants and
animals from patentable subject matter; the implicit right to
set patentability standards (novelty, inventive step, utility,
disclosure) so as to maximize disclosure, minimize patenting of
discoveries, and narrow patent breadth; and the right to grant
compulsory licenses.79
C. ENDORSE APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 8 AND 30 TO FOOD
SECURITY NEEDS
By their terms, Articles 8 and 30, as well as other
flexibility provisions in TRIPS, are available to allow
developing countries to devise intellectual property approaches
to agricultural biotechnology that best serve local food-security
needs.80 The United States could specifically endorse the use of
these provisions for that purpose and support efforts to craft
implementation schemes for these provisions that comply with
TRIPS, meet the food-security need, and preserve invention
incentives.
D. SPECIFICALLY ENDORSE RETENTION AND USE OF ARTICLE
27.3(B) IN THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS explicitly allows countries to
exclude plants from patentability, provided they establish an

http://www.mti.gov.sg/public/FTA/frm_FTA_Default.asp?sid=36 (last visited
Nov. 16, 2004).
78. WTO Ministerial Conference, Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN (01)/
DEC/1,
¶
19
(Nov.
20,
2001),
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm
(last
visited Nov. 16, 2004).
79. TRIPS, supra note 42, arts. 3.1, 27.1, 27.3, 30, 31.
80. Id. arts. 8, 30.
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effective alternative for protecting plant varieties.81 This
flexibility is vital for countries that rely on publicly funded
breeding programs and on the saving and reuse of seed by
farmers to develop and disseminate new seed varieties. The
United States could endorse retention of this provision and
support its use in ways that meet developing country foodsecurity needs without undercutting invention incentives.
E. FULLY IMPLEMENT ARTICLE 66.2 OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement says:
Developed countries shall provide incentives to enterprises and
institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and
encouraging technology transfer to least developed country members
in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological
base.82

This provision speaks directly to the disparity in
innovation capacity and access to technology between
developed and developing countries. It was part of the quid pro
quo in the TRIPS negotiations, in which developing countries
were to be provided assistance with technology transfer in
exchange for establishing the patent systems that developed
countries were seeking to protect their intellectual property.
The perception among many in developing countries is that,
while they are working to establish patent systems, the
developed countries have not met their technology transfer
obligations.83
The United States has not taken steps targeted specifically
at providing incentives to U.S. companies to transfer
agricultural technologies to developing countries for foodsecurity purposes. Rather, the United States report to the
WTO on its compliance with Article 66.2 recites several U.S.
statutes and programs, most predating the TRIPS Agreement,
that relate generally to technology transfer and trade
development, and it identifies some capacity-building programs
in areas of technology unrelated to agriculture and food
security.84 Nor has it taken any steps to provide incentives to
81. Id. art. 27.3.
82. Id. art. 66.2.
83. See WTO, Committee on Trade & Development, Special and
Differential Treatment Provisions: Joint Communication from the African
Group in the WTO, TN/CTD/W/3/Rev.1 (June 24, 2002), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/tn/ctd/W3R1.doc.
84. WTO, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Implementation of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement: Information
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U.S. companies to transfer patented technology, such as the
tools of biotechnology.85 The United States could work to fulfill
its obligation under Article 66.2 with respect to agricultural
biotechnology and food security by providing incentives,
perhaps in the form of tax credits or other economic subsidies,
for companies to invest in the development and
commercialization of applications of biotechnology that meet
developing country food security needs. However, the market
incentives for such commercial investment do not exist on a
viable scale in developing countries, and there is little
commercial infrastructure for the delivery of seeds where they
are needed for food security purposes. Government incentives
on any reasonably foreseeable scale are thus not likely to make
a significant or sustainable difference in the availability of
improved seeds to improve food security. Moreover, subsidizing
commercial applications of biotechnology is not likely to
advance Article 66.2’s objective of enabling developing
countries “to create a sound and viable technological base” of
their own.86
A course more likely to achieve the objectives of Article
66.2 would be to provide incentives to U.S. companies to
transfer the tools of biotechnology and other agricultural
technologies to public and private sector researchers based in
developing countries, who can apply them to local food security
problems following a public-private collaborative approach. A
model for the public-private innovation channel is the newly
founded, nonprofit African Agricultural Technology Foundation
(AATF).
With start-up funding from The Rockefeller
Foundation and the U.S. Agency for International
from
Developed
Country
Members,
Addendum:
United
States,
IP/C/W/388/Add.7 (Feb. 4, 2003), at docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/
t/IP/C/W388A7.doc.
85. Although Article 66.2 does not explicitly state that the technology that
developed countries must encourage their private sectors to transfer should be
patented technology, this is implicit in its being an article within TRIPS,
which is an agreement about intellectual property. This implication is
strongly reinforced in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, which created the obligation for developed countries to file
reports on their compliance with Article 66.2, and which explicitly reminds
countries that “each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the
light of the object and purpose of the Agreement.” WT Ministerial Conference,
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2,
¶ 5(a) (Nov. 20, 2001), at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments
/t/WT/min01/DEC2.doc.
86. TRIPS, supra note 42, art. 66.2.
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Development, the AATF was established specifically to identify
and facilitate the royalty-free transfer of proprietary
technologies that meet the needs of resource-poor African
farmers in ways that address and resolve the concerns of
technology providers, including concerns related to intellectual
property, protection of commercially important markets, and
liability.87 The United States could develop an agenda of
concrete actions to encourage and support the transfer of
technology from U.S.-based technology owners to those who can
make good use of it for developing country food-security
purposes, through AATF and similar organizations.
Implementation of Article 66.2 in these focused ways would
contribute directly to solving the technology access problem. It
would complement the creation of a policy framework that
reduces obstacles to access, but it is not an adequate substitute
for policy change. Developing countries need the flexibility to
develop intellectual-property systems that strike the right
balance between inducing and rewarding invention and
ensuring that inventions are put to practical uses that meet
local needs. Full implementation of Article 66.2 can help, but,
for purposes of gaining access to the tools they need to achieve
basic food security, developing countries should not be
dependent solely on decisions made in Washington or by
biotechnology companies.
CONCLUSION
The countries of sub-Saharan Africa face daunting social,
economic, and health challenges. Achieving basic food security
is the central one for many countries and individuals in that
region. If basic nutritional needs are not being met, the
consequences are seen, certainly, in individual suffering, but
also in the failure of societies to thrive socially and
economically.
Food security, economic development, and
poverty reduction are thoroughly intertwined. So too are the
interests of the United States and developing countries in
Africa and elsewhere. In the post-September 11 environment,
U.S. leaders increasingly recognize that the lack of food
security outside the United States is related to our quest for
physical security inside the United States.
There is also an increasing recognition in the U.S. media
87. The African Agricultural Technology Foundation, Who We Are, at
http://www.aftechfound.org/who.php (last visited Sept. 8, 2004).
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and policy circles that a wide range of U.S. policies affects the
efforts of developing countries to address food security and
other basic development problems.
These include U.S.
agricultural and trade policies, development assistance and
food aid policies, and the approaches the United States takes in
the international arena to address trade and other
development-related policy issues.
Patent policy is an important part of this picture. We
document in this article the relationship between U.S. patents
and patent policy and the opportunity of developing countries
to access the latest technology to meet their food-security
needs. Based on our analysis, there are changes the United
States could make in both its domestic and foreign policies that
would improve developing country access to the patented tools
of biotechnology without significantly undercutting the core
invention incentives of the patent system. These changes
deserve consideration as the United States grapples with its
heightened national interest in global food security and works
to build a harmonized global patent system that embraces the
needs of developed and developing countries alike.

